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WARSAW v. CHICAGO METALLIC CEILINGS, INC.:
COMPENSATION FOR PRESCRIPTIVE
EASEMENTS
I. INTRODUCTION
In Warsaw v. Chicago Metallic Ceilings, Inc.,1 the California
Supreme Court held that the acquirer of a prescriptive easement need not
compensate the underlying property owner for the easement's reasonable
value. This decision is significant because it deprives the underlying
property owner of the right to use his property without any compensa-
tion for that deprivation. This Note examines whether, in the appropri-
ate circumstances, the doctrines of prescription and adverse possession
preclude the payment of compensation for a property right so acquired.
In the course of the analysis, use of the court's equitable power is consid-
ered. The analogous area of encroachment and nuisance are explored for
guidance in forming a remedy; and, a "balancing of the relative hard-
ships" approach is suggested. Additionally, the likelihood of legislative
action is considered and possible legislation is proposed.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In 1972, Ernest E. Warsaw (plaintiff) and Chicago Metallic Ceil-
ings, Inc. (defendant) purchased contiguous commercial lots in Vernon,
California.2 The lots were purchased from a common owner and were
unimproved at the time of the sale. Warsaw's agreement with the seller
stipulated that the seller construct a large commercial building on War-
saw's lot, erected according to Warsaw's specifications.3
When completed, the building covered almost the entire Warsaw
parcel. Warsaw constructed loading docks on the north side of the build-
ing to facilitate the loading and unloading of trucks. A forty-foot-wide
driveway, which abutted and ran parallel to Chicago Metallic's southern
boundary, provided access to Warsaw's loading docks.4
Chicago Metallic's building was considerably smaller than War-
saw's building. Its southern wall was 150 feet from the southern bound-
ary abutting Warsaw's property. With the exception of this one building,
1. 35 Cal. 3d 564, 676 P.2d 584, 199 Cal. Rptr. 773 (1984).
2. Id. at 569, 676 P.2d at 586, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 775. Warsaw purchased the southern
parcel; Chicago Metallic purchased the northern lot. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
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the remainder of Chicago Metallic's lot was unimproved.5
The driveway on Warsaw's lot proved to be inadequate for the posi-
tioning and maneuvering of trucks using the loading docks.6 Drivers
could not turn and position their trucks at the loading docks without
driving onto Chicago Metallic's property. If the trucks were not allowed
to use Chicago Metallic's property in this manner, it would destroy the
commercial value of Warsaw's building.7
Between 1972 and 1979, trucks delivering material to Warsaw used
a portion of Chicago Metallic's property to enter, turn around, park and
leave Warsaw's loading docks.8 During this time, Warsaw unsuccess-
fully attempted to acquire an easement from Chicago Metallic. 9 During
the original negotiations between the seller, Warsaw and Chicago Metal-
lic, the creation of an easement over Chicago Metallic's property was
considered and rejected.10
In 1979, Chicago Metallic developed plans to build a warehouse on
the southern portion of its property. This plan dictated construction on
the portion of Chicago Metallic's land Warsaw used for maneuvering
trucks. In preparing a foundation for construction, Chicago Metallic
raised a dirt pad approximately five feet within its southern property line.
This blocked Warsaw's use of Chicago Metallic's property. In response,
Warsaw commenced an action for injunctive and declaratory relief."
Initially, the trial court denied Warsaw's request for a preliminary
injunction to prevent Chicago Metallic from continuing construction.
Subsequently, Chicago Metallic completed the warehouse on the con-
tested area. After a trial on the merits, the trial court found that Warsaw
had acquired a prescriptive easement12 which extended the depth of Chi-
5. Id.
6. Id. The court noted that the inadequacy of the driveway was apparent from the begin-
ning of Warsaw's operation. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 570, 676 P.2d at 586, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 775.
9. Id. Warsaw was also unsuccessful in his attempts to create mutual easements over his
and Chicago Metallic's property. Id. at 570, 676 P.2d at 586-87, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 775-76.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. The trial court found that an easement by implication was not created because the
parties had considered and rejected the possibility of creating an easement during the original
negotiations between the seller, Warsaw and Chicago Metallic, Because the parcels were un-
improved at the time of the conveyance, there was no basis for an easement implied from prior
existing use. Id. at 570, 676 P.2d at 586, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 775. See Van Sandt v. Royster, 148
Kan. 495, 502, 83 P.2d 698, 702 (1938) (easement implied from prior existing use when pur-
chaser is charged with notice of existing use at time of purchase). Furthermore, there was no
basis for an easement by necessity because the driveway on Warsaw's property provided in-
gress and egress. See R. CUNNINGHAM, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 447 (1984) (easement im-
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cago Metallic's lot at a width of twenty-five feet.13 Furthermore, the
court ordered Chicago Metallic to remove that portion of the warehouse
which interfered with Warsaw's use of the newly declared easement.
14
The court of appeal affirmed the trial court's decision.15 Noting the
hardship the decision caused Chicago Metallic, however, the court re-
manded the matter to the trial court to determine reasonable compensa-
tion, based on the fair market value of the property interest acquired, to
be paid to Chicago Metallic by Warsaw.
1 6
The California Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeal's
holding that Warsaw had acquired an easement, but reversed the court of
appeal's decision regarding the payment of reasonable compensation. 7
III. REASONING OF THE COURT
The California Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeal's deci-
sion that a prescriptive easement was acquired because Warsaw's use of
Chicago Metallic's property was open, notorious, continuous and adverse
for the statutory period of five years." The supreme court, however,
reversed the court of appeal's decision to award compensation for the
plied from necessity only when "the severence [of a parcel from the grantor's land] will more
or less landlock one of the parcels unless its owner is given implied access over the other
parcel"). See also Applegate v. Ota, 146 Cal. App. 3d 702, 714, 194 Cal. Rptr. 331, 338 (1984)
(easement by necessity arises when grantor conveys land that is completely shut off from ac-
cess to any road by grantor's remaining land).
13. Warsaw, 35 Cal. 3d at 574, 676 P.2d at 587, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 776. The easement
covered 16,250 square feet of Chicago Metallic's property.
14. Id. The Warsaw court also dealt with the issue of whether Warsaw should contribute
to the cost of removal of Chicago Metallic's warehouse, which had been completed during the
course of the litigation. The court found that such a contribution would be inequitable because
Warsaw had perfected a lawful easement before construction of the warehouse. Nevertheless,
Chicago Metallic proceeded with construction of the warehouse with prior notice of Warsaw's
claim. Id. at 576, 676 P.2d at 591, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 780.
15. Warsaw v. Chicago Metallic Ceilings, Inc., 139 Cal. App. 3d 260, 188 Cal. Rptr. 563
(1983), vacated, 35 Cal. 3d 564, 676 P.2d 584, 199 Cal. Rptr. 773 (1984). The court of appeal
also affirmed the trial court's issuance of a mandatory injunction compelling Chicago Metallic
to remove the structure which interfered with Warsaw's use of the easement. Id. at 267, 188
Cal. Rptr. at 567.
16. Id. at 270, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 569. The claim for compensation was not briefed or
argued before the court of appeal. That court raised the issue and ordered compensation sua
sponte, stating "a court of equity is not limited in granting relief by the demands and offers of
the parties themselves, but may fashion a decree which will do justice to all parties." Id.
(citing Redke v. Silvertrust, 6 Cal. 3d 94, 490 P.2d 805, 98 Cal. Rptr. 293 (1971), cert denied,
405 U.S. 1041 (1972)).
17. Warsaw, 35 Cal. 3d at 569, 676 P.2d at 586, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 775. The supreme court
adopted the court of appeal opinion with respect to the acquisition of the easement. Id.
18. Warsaw v. Chicago Metallic Ceilings, Inc., 35 Cal. 3d 564, 569, 676 P.2d 584, 586, 199
Cal. Rptr. 773, 775 (1984).
114 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:111
easement.19 The majority found that there was "no basis in law or eq-
uity" to require the acquirer of a prescriptive easement to compensate the
underlying property owner20 and that California Civil Code section
100721 insulated Warsaw from any liability.2 2 The majority concluded
that payment of compensation in this case could defeat the underlying
policies of prescription and adverse possession: the reduction of litiga-
tion and preservation of the peace by protecting possession.23 While rec-
ognizing that its decision might not square with "'modem ideals in a
sophisticated, congested, peaceful society,'" the majority concluded that
because this method of acquiring title "'remains on the books,'" any
change must therefore come from the legislature.24
The concurring opinion, written by Justice Grodin,25 questioned the
policy considerations on which the majority opinion was based. Justice
Grodin was unconvinced that the majority's decision would reduce liti-
gation or protect possession in a modern, urban society. Because, how-
ever, he was persuaded that any changes in the prescriptive easement
doctrine should come from the California legislature,26 rather than from
19. Id. at 574-75, 676 P.2d at 589-90, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 778-79. Justice Richardson wrote
the majority opinion and was joined by Justices Mosk, Kaus and Broussard. Justice Grodin
wrote a concurring opinion in which Chief Justice Bird joined. Justice Reynoso dissented in a
separate opinion.
20. Id. at 574, 676 P.2d at 590, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 779.
21. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1007 (West 1982) provides:
Occupancy for the period prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure as sufficient to
bar any action for the recovery of the property confers a title thereto, denominated a
title by prescription, which is sufficient against all, but no possession by any person,
firm or corporation no matter how long continued of any land, water, water right,
easement, or other property whatsoever dedicated to a public use by a public utility,
or dedicated to or owned by the state or public entity, shall ever ripen into any title,
interest or right against the owner thereof.
22. Warsaw, 35 Cal. 3d at 574, 676 P.2d at 589, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 778.
23. Id., 676 P.2d at 590, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 779.
24. Id. at 575, 676 P.2d at 590, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 779 (quoting Finley v. Yuba County
Water Dist., 99 Cal. App. 3d 691, 696-97, 160 Cal. Rptr. 423, 427 (1979)).
25. Id. at 576, 676 P.2d at 591, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 780 (Grodin, J., concurring).
26. Id. (Grodin, J., concurring). Justice Grodin stated that because the legislature had
modified the "harsh application of the prescriptive easement doctrine" in 1965, further change
in that area of the law should also come from the legislature. Id. at 576-77, 676 P.2d at 591,
199 Cal. Rptr. at 780 (Grodin, J., concurring). The modification to which Justice Grodin
referred was the addition of CAL. CIV. CODE § 1008 (West 1982), which provides:
No use by any person or persons, no matter how long continued, of any land, shall
ever ripen into an easement by prescription, if the owner of such property posts at
each entrance to the property or at intervals of not more than 200 feet along the
boundary a sign reading substantially as follows: "Right to pass by permission, and
subject to the control, of owner: Section 1008, Civil Code."
This section hardly seems to preclude an award of compensation in Warsaw, nor does it
indicate that the legislature considered whether compensation would ever be appropriate. Fur-
thermore, it does not indicate broad legislative attention to the law of prescription. Rather,
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the courts, he joined in affirming the court's judgment.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Reynoso stressed the view that Civil
Code section 1007 merely describes the title conferred by prescription; it
does not determine whether a court may impose a condition for the pro-
tection of the easement.27 Noting that the practical result of the court's
decision was to take Chicago Metallic's property without any compensa-
tion, Justice Reynoso argued that the court should have exercised its eq-
uity power to impose a condition for the protection of the easement,28
and that the appropriate condition in this case was the payment of rea-
sonable compensation to Chicago Metallic. 29 Justice Reynoso concluded
that the majority's decision would not reduce litigation and was not nec-
essary to protect possession, and that, therefore, it did not further the
policies underlying the doctrine of prescription.3"
IV. ANALYSIS
The majority in Warsaw took the position that despite the possibly
outmoded nature of title by prescription, the California Civil Code con-
tinues to provide for this method of obtaining land.31 The court con-
cluded that because Warsaw met the requirements of Civil Code section
1007 and Code of Civil Procedure section 321,32 Warsaw incurred no
liability to Chicago Metallic. 33 Finding no basis in equity to order com-
pensation, the supreme court did not exercise its equitable power in this
"[t]his enactment, sponsored by the International Council of Shopping Centers, appears to
provide [a] . . . simple procedure [posting signs] by which the landowner can conclusively
insulate his property from prescriptive rights." CALIFORNIA CONTINUING EDUCATION OF
THE BAR, REVIEW OF SELECTED 1965 CODE LEGISLATION 48-49 (1965). The legislature
intended this section to limit the factfinder's freedom "to find that a given use was adverse and
hostile notwithstanding such signs." Id. at 49. Prior to this enactment, posted signs were
merely evidence of permissive, rather than adverse use. The factfinder could find the use was
adverse even where signs were posted. Id. After this statute's enactment, the factfinder must
find such use permissive.
27. Warsaw, 35 Cal. 3d at 577, 676 P.2d at 591, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 780 (1984) (Reynoso, J.,
dissenting).
28. Id. at 579, 676 P.2d at 593, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 782 (Reynoso, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 581, 676 P.2d at 594, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 783 (Reynoso, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 580, 676 P.2d at 593-94, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 782-83 (Reynoso, J., dissenting).
31. Warsaw v. Chicago Metallic Ceilings, Inc., 35 Cal. 3d 564, 575, 676 P.2d 584, 590, 199
Cal. Rptr. 773, 779 (1984).
32. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 321 (West 1982) provides:
In every action for the recovery of real property, or the possession thereof, the person
establishing a legal title to the property is presumed to have been possessed thereof
within the time required by law, and the occupation of the property by any other
person is deemed to have been under and in subordination to the legal title, unless it
appear [sic] that the property has been held and possessed adversely to such legal
title, for five years before the commencement of the action.
33. Warsaw, 35 Cal. 3d at 574-75, 676 P.2d at 589-90, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 778-79.
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case.34 Instead, the court stated that "any decision to alter [the] system
[of acquiring an interest in land by prescription] by requiring the pay-
ment of compensation clearly would be a matter for the Legislature."3
The court's refusal to exercise its equitable power in this case seems
to rest on its interpretation of California Civil Code section 1007 as con-
clusively precluding any award of compensation. The majority deter-
mined that section 1007 retains the traditional policies underlying the
common law doctrine of prescription: "'protecting' and 'stabilizing' a
long and continuous use or possession as against the claims of an alleged
'owner' of the property."36 Therefore, the majority concluded that Chi-
cago Metallic's "claim for damages or fair compensation for an alleged
'taking' must be rejected." 37 The rationale seems to be that because this
taking is contemplated by section 1007, the taking is not inequitable.
This interpretation leaves the next move, if any, to the legislature.
For purposes of analysis, three issues must be considered:
(1) whether California Civil Code section 1007 conclusively precludes an
award of compensation; (2) whether the rationale underlying the law of
prescription precludes an award of compensation; and (3) whether a
court in equity has the authority to order that compensation be paid to
the underlying property owner by the acquirer of a prescriptive
easement.
A. A Statutory Scheme
California Civil Code section 1007 provides, in part: "Occupancy
for the period prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure as sufficient to
bar any action for the recovery of the property confers a title thereto,
denominated a title by prescription, which is sufficient against all .... .31
California Code of Civil Procedure section 321 sets a five-year period for
acquisition of title by prescription.39 Because the adverse user's prescrip-
tive title was "sufficient against all," the Warsaw court reasoned that
there was no basis to incur liability to the underlying property owner.4°
The court concluded, therefore, that Warsaw need not compensate
34. Id.
35. Id. at 575, 676 P.2d at 590, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 779. The court also noted that the
defendant made no argument that prescription is unconstitutional. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See supra note 21 for text of pertinent part of CAL. CIV. CODE § 1007.
39. See supra note 32 for text of pertinent part of CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 321.
40. Warsaw v. Chicago Metallic Ceilings, Inc., 35 Cal. 3d 564, 574, 676 P.2d 584, 590, 199
Cal. Rptr. 773, 779 (1984).
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Chicago Metallic.41
The supreme court's reliance on California Civil Code section 1007
is questionable. Traditionally, that section has been interpreted as
"merely fix[ing] the time in which a right by prescription shall be ac-
quired, but.., not alter[ing] the requisites which before the code were
essential to the growth of a prescriptive right."'42 The statute appears to
do nothing more than codify the common law of prescription.43 The
supreme court stated that "the statutory procedure for acquiring an ease-
ment by prescription quite clearly retains the traditional common law
rule that such an easement may be obtained without incurring any liabil-
ity to the underlying property owner."'  The court, however, cited
neither authority nor reason for this "common law rule," stating only
that the underlying property owner's claim for compensation "must be
rejected."45 If, as the supreme court contended, the statute retains this
common law rule, the issue of compensation must be resolved by re-
course to the common law of prescription and not by mere citation to
section 1007.
B. Prescription at Common Law
A party claiming a prescriptive easement over the property of an-
other must show that his use of the property was open, notorious, contin-
uous and adverse for an uninterrupted period of five years.46 Application
of this rule gave Warsaw a prescriptive easement over Chicago Metallic's
property.47 Thus, for the purpose of analysis, the existence of the ease-
ment is presumed.
At English common law the theoretical basis of prescription was the
lost grant.48 "Its continuance has been justified because of its functional
41. Id. at 575, 676 P.2d at 590, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 779.
42. Thomas v. England, 71 Cal. 456, 458, 12 P. 491, 492 (1886). In Thomas, the plaintiff
sought to establish a right of way over the defendant's land and to enjoin the defendant from
obstructing that right of way. Id. at 457, 12 P. at 491. The supreme court affirmed the trial
court's finding that the plaintiff's right to pass over the defendant's land was with the defend-
ant's implied permission. Id. at 460, 12 P. at 493. Notwithstanding § 1007, the plaintiff's
claim to a prescriptive easement was denied because his use of the land was not adverse to that
of the defendant.
43. Warsaw, 35 Cal. 3d at 577-78, 676 P.2d at 592, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 781 (Reynoso, J.,
dissenting).
44. Id. at 574, 676 P.2d at 589, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 778.
45. Id. at 575, 676 P.2d at 590, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 779.
46. Warsaw v. Chicago Metallic Ceilings, Inc., 35 Cal. 3d 564, 570, 676 P.2d 584, 587, 199
Cal. Rptr. 773, 776 (1984) (citing, inter alia, Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Crockett Land & Cattle
Co., 70 Cal. App. 283, 290, 233 P. 370, 372 (1924)).
47. Id. at 570-73, 676 P.2d at 587-89, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 776-78.
48. Id. at 575, 676 P.2d at 590, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 779 (citing 3 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF
118 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:111
utility in helping to cause prompt termination of controversies before the
possible loss of evidence and in stabilizing long continued property
uses."'49 The Warsaw court noted the analogous justification for adverse
possession which "is not to reward the taker or punish the person dispos-
sessed, but to reduce litigation and to preserve the peace by protecting
possession that has been maintained for a statutorily deemed sufficient
period of time."'
The supreme court in Warsaw concluded that compensating Chi-
cago Metallic would defeat the goals which prescription is thought to
further-protecting and stabilizing long continued use or possession.51
Neither goal, however, seems to be compromised by requiring Warsaw to
pay for what he has acquired by prescription. Conditioning the protec-
tion on the payment of fair compensation to Chicago Metallic for the
property right it has lost does not leave Warsaw's long continued use
unprotected since the prescriptive easement assures Warsaw's continued
use. Neither is the stability of Warsaw's prescriptive title affected if he is
required to pay the fair market value for the property right he has
acquired.
It does not seem that an award of compensation in this case would
have defeated the salutary goal of reducing litigation. Warsaw would not
have been subjected to the repeated "claims of an alleged 'owner' of the
property."52 Moreover, even if compensation had been ordered in this
case, the parties' rights in the easement would have been conclusively
established by the courts.
To be sure, denying Chicago Metallic any compensation may be
contrary to the policies enunciated by the court, because such a result in
effect operates to reward the taker and to punish the person dispossessed.
Without compensation, Warsaw receives a windfall-the right to use
Chicago Metallic's property as a driveway at no cost to himself. Chicago
REAL PROPERTY % 413, 34-103 to 34-104 (1981)). The lost grant was a legal fiction used to
create a presumption that the prescriptive use dated back to "time immemorial." The theory
maintained that proof of an easement's use for the period prescribed by the statute of limita-
tions raised a presumption of a grant which had been lost. This presumption gave rise to a
second presumption, which was necessary until 1832, that the prescriptive use had been since
"time immemorial." R. CUNNINGHAM, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 451 (1984).
49. Warsaw, 35 Cal. 3d at 575, 676 P.2d at 590, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 779 (quoting 3 R.
POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY % 413, 34-103 to 34-104 (1981)).
50. Id. (citing Finley v. Yuba County Water Dist., 99 Cal. App. 3d 691, 696-97, 160 Cal.
Rptr. 423, 427 (1979)).
51. Id.
52. Id. Contrary to the majority's fear that compensation in this case would subject War-
saw to multiple litigation from "alleged owners," it seems clear that Chicago Metallic owns the
underlying property.
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Metallic is punished-it loses the right to use its own property and the
value of its property is reduced by the value of the easement. Compensa-
tion would have lessened the reward and punishment aspects in this case,
ameliorated Chicago Metallic's loss and merely required Warsaw to pay
for its newly acquired property right. If, as the supreme court contends,
reward and punishment are not the goals of prescription,53 it follows that
compensation is not only permissible, but appropriate.
While neither adverse possession nor prescription compel the pay-
ment of compensation upon the creation of prescriptive title in the ac-
quirer of a property right, it seems that neither doctrine, as applied to
Warsaw, precludes such payment. Whether or not compensation had
been ordered, the newly acquired property right would have remained
protected. Additionally, an award of compensation is not likely to affect
the amount of litigation because such procedures normally stem from the
underlying property dispute. Perhaps the common law rule precluding
liability should be reconsidered in light of the maxim, "[w]hen the reason
of a rule ceases, so should the rule itself." 4 The question remains, how-
ever, whether or not a court has the authority to order the acquirer to
compensate the underlying property owner.
C. Equitable Power of the Court
"Equity... has its origin in the necessity for exceptions to the appli-
cation of rules of law in those cases where the law, by reason of its
universality, would create injustice in the affairs of men."55 In Warsaw,
the declaration of a prescriptive easement without an award of compen-
sation to the underlying property owner appears to be such an injustice.
Warsaw's building was constructed by the seller to Warsaw's specifica-
tions.5 6 It was this design that created the need for Warsaw's trucks to
use Chicago Metallic's property for maneuvering.
57
53. Id.
54. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3510 (West 1982).
55. Estate of Vargas, 36 Cal. App. 3d 714, 718, 111 Cal. Rptr. 779, 781 (1974). In Vargas,
the decedent had been a husband and father to two separate families, neither of which knew of
the other's existence. The court equally divided the estate between the legal wife and the
putative wife. The court noted that "[t]he laws of marital succession assume compliance with
basic law (Civ. Code, § 3548) and do not provide for contingencies arising during the course of
felonious activity. For this reason resort to equitable principles becomes particularly appropri-
ate here." Id.
56. Warsaw v. Chicago Metallic Ceilings, Inc., 35 Cal. 3d 564, 569, 676 P.2d 584, 586, 199
Cal. Rptr. 773, 775 (1984).
57. Appellant's (Chicago Metallic's) brief at page 11 stated: "Had Warsaw not designed
into his building the need to use Chicago Metallic's property, this dispute never would have
arisen. Without the compensation aspect of the Court of Appeals decision, Chicago Metallic
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Moreover, as the court of appeal stated: "[The] conclusion that
[Warsaw] had acquired a prescriptive easement cannot mask the fact that
the result is a harsh one indeed."58 The court continued: "A simple
affimance of the judgment would result in [Warsaw, an admitted tres-
passer,] acquiring practical possession of a sixteen thousand, two hun-
dred fifty (16,250) square foot parcel free of charge."5 9
"Equity acts in order to meet the requirements of every case, and to
satisfy the needs of a progressive social condition, in which new primary
rights and duties are constantly arising, and new kinds of wrongs are
constantly committed."'  Prescription and adverse possession evolved in
an agrarian England hundreds of years ago.61 It was in this setting that
any common law rule precluding liability to the underlying property
owner developed.62 The present case, on the other hand, arose in a mod-
em, urban and commercial setting. In its analogy to adverse possession,
the supreme court noted that despite the fact that the doctrine may not
"always [square] with modem ideals in a sophisticated, congested, and
peaceful society," 63 title may be acquired by prescription because "this
method of obtaining land remains on the books." 6 The court recognized
the archaic nature of its decision,65 yet failed to exercise its equitable
power to achieve the just goal that equity is uniquely suited to accom-
plish. In this case, compensation is certainly a remedy which would sat-
isfy the needs of a progressive social condition and keep with modem
notions of fairness and justice.
The fact that an award of compensation for a prescriptive easement
is unprecedented, however, does not block a court's use of its equitable
alone will have to pay the price of Warsaw's mistake." Evidence at trial showed that Warsaw's
design put his loading bays on the side of his building that faced Chicago Metallic's property.
Reporter's Transcript at 202, lines 13-20. "[I]t was this very design which created the entire
problem by rendering Warsaw's principal loading bays virtually useless without taking space
for truck maneuvering purposes from neighboring property belonging to Chicago." Appel-
lant's brief at 11.
58. Warsaw v. Chicago Metallic Ceilings, Inc., 139 Cal. App. 3d 260, 268, 188 Cal. Rptr.
563, 568 (1983), vacated, 35 Cal. 3d 564, 676 P.2d 584, 199 Cal. Rptr. 773 (1984).
59. Id.
60. Estate of Vargas, 36 Cal. App. 3d 714, 718, 111 Cal. Rptr. 779, 781 (1974).
61. See 7 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 11012 (1977) (noting the procedural aspects of ad-
verse possession and tracing the history of statutes of limitations back to 1275).
62. Despite the court's broad statement of the "common law rule" precluding liability to
the underlying property owner, there is no citation to authority for such a rule. Moreover, no
case has stated such a rule.
63. Warsaw, 35 Cal. 3d at 575, 676 P.2d at 590, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 779 (quoting Finley v.
Yuba County Water Dist., 99 Cal. App. 3d 691, 696-97, 160 Cal. Rptr. 423, 429 (1979)).
64. Id.
65. Id.
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power. "Equity need not wait upon precedent but will assert itself in
those situations where right and justice would be defeated but for its in-
tervention."66 Moreover, "while sitting in its equitable capacity, a court
may avail itself of powers broad and flexible and capable of being ex-
panded to deal with novel cases and conditions."'67 The present case
seems to be such a novel case or condition. By Warsaw's own admission,
it was a willful trespasser, while Chicago Metallic-as the court of appeal
indicated-"was at best accommodating, and at worst, negligent by fail-
ing to take affirmative action to block the trespass."6
D. Encroachment Cases
The nature of Warsaw's prescriptive right to use Chicago Metallic's
property deprived Chicago Metallic of the right to use its property as
planned69 and, therefore, reduced the value of its property. While the
issue of compensation is without precedent, the analogous situation of
encroachment is instructive. In encroachment cases, courts sitting in eq-
uity have dealt with the problem of creating an easement in favor of a
party who builds a structure which "encroaches" onto the land of an-
other. In these cases, where the encroacher's use of the land is adverse to
that of the underlying property owner, courts demonstrate their broad
and flexible powers of equity to fashion remedies that serve society's
sense of justice.
Encroachment exists where one party builds a structure in such a
way that part of that structure is on the land of another.70 Typically, the
underlying property owner will seek a mandatory injunction compelling
66. Estate of Vargas, 36 Cal. App. 3d 714, 718, 111 Cal. Rptr. 779, 781 (1974).
67. MacFarlane v. Peters, 103 Cal. App. 3d 627, 631, 163 Cal. Rptr. 655, 657 (1980). In
MacFarlane, the court of appeal affirmed the trial court's exercise of its equitable power to
reform a treasurer's deed and restore lots to a usable and salable form. The defendant, a
purchaser at an assessment sale, bought 0.0000575 percent of an entire tract and chose a con-
figuration of no use to himself except to prevent any use of the remaining property. This
configuration was a continuous strip around the perimeter of the tract, with three equidistant
strips running across the entire parcel from east to west. The buyer's only use for this config-
uration was to force the owner of the majority of the tract to negotiate with the buyer on his
terms.
68. Warsaw, 139 Cal. App. 3d at 269, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 569.
69. Warsaw's use of the easement as a maneuvering area for trucks is incompatible with
Chicago Metallic's use of the same area for a warehouse. Chicago Metallic would, however,
still be entitled to use that property in any way which did not interfere with Warsaw's use of
the easement.
70. D. DOBBs, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 355 (1973). Encroachment must
be distinguished from situations where a structure is simply built on the wrong property. In
the latter situation, the property owner rarely seeks removal of the structure; instead, the im-
prover usually seeks compensation for the structure. Id. at 357.
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the removal of the encroaching structure.7
1. Balancing the relative hardships
Analysis in encroachment cases focuses on two concepts. First,
courts maintain that no one should be permitted to take the property of
another merely because he is willing to pay for it.72 Second, at the other
extreme, courts recognize that the party procuring an injunction will be
able to extort the builder of the structure if the court orders the removal
of a substantial structure in order to protect an insignificant strip of
land.73 Accordingly, courts have developed a "balancing of the relative
hardships" approach:74 "Where the hardship is deemed sufficient to jus-
tify refusal of the injunction, the [encroacher], on payment of damages,
acquires... an easement in the land on which the structure encroaches
.... "Is In effect, a court in equity is awarding the right to use the
property of another conditioned on the payment of compensation by the
acquirer of that right.
The first California case granting an easement to an encroacher con-
ditioned on the payment of damages to the underlying property owner
was Ukhtomski v. Tioga Mutual Water Co.76 In that case, the water
company inadvertently constructed a concrete reservoir which en-
croached onto a small portion of the plaintiffs' land.7 7 The plaintiffs
brought an action seeking both damages for the trespass to their land and
an injunction restraining the water company from using the reservoir in
the future. In affirming the trial court's denial of the injunction, the
court of appeal observed: "It is our opinion that the court properly de-
nied an injunction and assessed damages against the defendants to com-
pensate plaintiffs for the injury sustained by defendants' continuing
trespass.",78 The court went on to grant the water company an easement
"to protect them in the enjoyment of the use of the reservoir . . . for
which they have been compelled to pay."7 9
71. Id. at 355.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 356. In Christensen v. Tucker, 114 Cal. App. 2d 554, 250 P.2d 660 (1952), the
court of appeal noted that the encroacher is adequately protected by an easement. Quieting
title in the encroacher is neither necessary nor appropriate. If the encroaching structure is
removed at some future time, the need for the encroachment expires and, therefore, the ease-
ment expires. Id. at 563, 250 P.2d at 665.
76. 12 Cal. App. 2d 726, 55 P.2d 1251 (1936).
7.7. The encroachment was approximately 0.15 acres. Id. at 727, 55 P.2d at 1251.
78. Id. at 729, 55 P.2d at 1252.
79. Id.
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Implicit in the court's grant of an easement in favor of the water
company was the condition that the water company pay damages to the
underlying property owners."0 In balancing the relative hardships of the
parties,"1 the court noted the slight injury to the underlying property
owners as compared to the water company's injury if barred from using
the reservoir in the future.8 2 The relative hardship of the parties tipped
the scales in favor of the water company.8 3 Consequently, the court or-
dered the water company to pay damages and declared an easement over
the plaintiffs' property.8 4
In Christensen v. Tucker,"5 the court of appeal held that an injunc-
tion in favor of the underlying property owner should not be granted if
the value of the encroaching structures far exceeds the value of the land
occupied by those encroachments.8 6  The court remanded the case to
determine whether or not the injury to the encroacher-if he were com-
pelled to remove the encroaching structures from plaintiff's property-
would greatly exceed the injury suffered by the plaintiff if the encroach-
ment were allowed to remain.
8 7
In Miller v. Johnston,"8 the plaintiffs were awarded an easement for
ingress and egress to the plaintiffs' garage upon payment of compensa-
tion to the defendant. It was impractical to drive a vehicle without the
easement because the plaintiffs' driveway encroached onto the defend-
ant's land. The court noted that a denial of the easement would work a
hardship on the encroachers which would have been greatly dispropor-
80. While the Tioga court did not expressly condition the easement on the payment of
damages by the encroaching water company, it is implausible that the easement would have
been granted without compensation to the underlying property owner for the injury caused by
the continuing trespass.
81. Tioga, 12 Cal. App. 2d at 728, 55 P.2d at 1252.
82. In denying the injunction, the Tioga court noted the additional factor that 500 persons
would be cut off from their water supply if the reservoir were shut down. Id. at 729, 55 P.2d at
1252. This threatened injury to the public was a factor considered by the court in balancing
the relative hardships, but was not the basis of the decision. It is also noteworthy that,
although the water company was presumably a public utility having the power of eminent
domain, the court's decision was not based on that ground.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. 114 Cal. App. 2d 554, 250 P.2d 660 (1952).
86. The encroachments were a concrete abutment, a badminton court and a garage wall.
The abutment crossed the entire length of the parties' boundary, varying in depth from three
feet to six inches. It was described by the court as a "long triangle with a three foot base, and
125 feet in length." Id. at 555-56, 250 P.2d at 661. The north wall of the garage encroached
from two feet to eight inches into the property for a distance of 25 feet. Id. The badminton
court encroached on the property from six to eight inches for a length of 23 feet. Id.
87. Id. at 565, 250 P.2d at 666-67.
88. 270 Cal. App. 2d 289, 75 Cal. Rptr. 699 (1969).
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tionate to any hardship suffered by the underlying property owner if ac-
cess were continued.89
2. Conditions for compensation through encroachment analysis
From the foregoing cases, it can be seen that the balancing of rela-
tive hardships approach to encroachment cases gives courts discretion to
grant the underlying property owner an injunction compelling removal
of the encroachment or to deny the injunction conditioned upon the pay-
ment of damages by the encroacher. In utilizing this discretion, courts
have determined that certain conditions must be met in order to deny the
underlying property owner injunctive relief.90 First, the encroachment
must be innocent and not the result of a willful act.9' Second, where the
underlying property owner will be irreparably injured by the encroach-
ment, an injunction will issue regardless of the injury to the encroacher. 92
Third, the hardship to the encroacher must be greatly disproportionate
to that of the underlying property owner if the encroachment is allowed
to continue.
93
a. no compensation for unwillful acts
The first condition the courts impose concerns how the encroach-
ment is treated. Courts will not deny an underlying property owner an
injunction where the encroachment was the result of a willful act. 94 Nor
will the courts grant an easement to a knowing wrongdoer.95 Further-
more, where the encroacher is negligent, and that negligence is the cause
of the encroachment, the encroacher is not entitled to invoke the balanc-
ing of relative hardships doctrine. 96 If, however, the underlying property
89. Id. at 307, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 711. The Miller court noted that the plaintiffs were inno-
cent of any wrongdoing and that the encroachment was not the result of any act or omission
on their part. The underlying property owner would not suffer irreparable injury if the plain-
tiffs were allowed continued use of the encroachment area. Finally, the court noted the dispro-
portionately great hardship to the plaintiffs if they were not allowed continued use of the area.
Id. at 307-08, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 711.
90. Compare Ukhtomski v. Tioga Mut. Water Co., 12 Cal. App. 2d 726, 55 P.2d 1251
(1936) with Christensen v. Tucker, 114 Cal. App. 2d 554, 250 P.2d 660 (1952) and Miller v.
Johnston, 270 Cal. App. 2d 289, 75 Cal. Rptr. 699 (1969). See also Donnell v. Bisso Bros., 10
Cal. App. 3d 38, 88 Cal. Rptr. 645 (1970) (denying removal of road encroaching on railroad
land by allowing damages and imposing a servitude on the land encroached upon).
91. Miller, 270 Cal. App. 2d at 306, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 710 (citing Christensen, 114 Cal. App.
2d at 562-63, 250 P.2d at 665).
92. Id. (citing Christensen, 114 Cal. App. 2d at 562-63, 250 P.2d at 665).
93. Id. (citing Christensen, 114 Cal. App. 2d at 562-63, 250 P.2d at 665).
94. Christensen, 114 Cal. App. 2d at 563, 250 P.2d at 665.
95. Id. at 563-64, 250 P.2d at 665-66.
96. Id. at 563, 250 P.2d at 665.
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owner contributes to the situation by negligently allowing the encroacher
to build an encroaching structure, "the trier of fact is entitled to weigh
the hardships each may suffer, and the negligence of the one against the
other."
'9 7
b. removal of encroachment causing irreparable hardship
The second condition considers the nature and extent of the injury
to the underlying property owner if the encroachment continues.9 If the
encroachment causes irreparable injury to the underlying property
owner, an injunction ordering its removal will be issued regardless of the
injury to the encroacher.99
c. disproportionate hardship
If, on the other hand, the encroachment does not work irreparable
injury on the underlying property owner, the court will balance the rela-
tive hardships of the parties."° Where this balance shows that the hard-
ship to the encroacher is greater than that suffered by the underlying
property owner, the encroacher will be granted an easement on the prop-
erty of his neighbor.10 1 If, however, the balance favors the underlying
property owner-that is, if he is compelled to remove the encroach-
ment-that party's injury is greater than the injury to the encroacher;
and an injunction will be issued compelling removal of the encroaching
structure. 102
In sum, the encroacher has a discretionary right to an easement over
his neighbor's property where the balance of relative hardships indicates
that failure to acquire the easement will produce an unjust result. The
Warsaw court, however, had no such discretion to declare an easement.
Having met all of the common law and statutory requirements, Warsaw
acquired an absolute right to prescriptive title. 0 3 Thus, the question be-
comes whether the same factors the court considers in determining an
encroacher's discretionary right to an easement are relevant to an inquiry
into compensation where the right to prescriptive title is absolute.
1 4
97. Id. at 564, 250 P.2d at 666.
98. Id. at 563, 250 P.2d at 665.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Warsaw v. Chicago Metallic Ceilings, Inc., 35 Cal. 3d 564, 570-74, 676 P.2d 584, 587-
90, 199 Cal. Rptr. 773, 776-79 (1984).
104. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
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E. Nuisance Cases
Within the context of a nuisance action brought to enjoin the opera-
tion of an otherwise lawful business, the Arizona Supreme Court has an-
swered this question in the affirmative. 0 5 Whereas encroachment arises
from a trespass, 10 6 nuisance refers to an unreasonable condition which
substantially interferes with the use and enjoyment of one's property.107
Typically, the offended property owner will bring a nuisance action seek-
ing to enjoin the offensive conduct of his neighbor. 10 While the en-
croachment and private nuisance"°9 theories are not identical, both
provide a discretionary right to relief. In each case the court balances the
relative hardships of the parties and compares their relative fault before
enjoining the offensive conduct."' Public nuisance,' on the other hand,
is enjoinable as a matter of absolute right, sharing with prescription the
unqualified right to relief once the legal elements of each are proved.
112
The Arizona Supreme Court's resolution of the relationship between dis-
cretionary and absolute rights in Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb
Development Co." 3 is helpful in defining the relationship between those
rights within the context of prescription.
105. Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 108 Ariz. 178, 494 P.2d 700 (1972).
106. Trespass is generally defined as an intrusion that interferes with the exclusive posses-
sion of property. R. CUNNINGHAM, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 411 (1984) defines trespass as an
unexcused and knowing entry onto the land of another. Thus, both prescription, which arises
from adverse use, and encroachment, which arises from a structure intruding onto the prop-
erty of another, are initially trespasses.
107. Id. at 413-14. Traditionally, trespass dealt with physical intrusions while nuisance did
not. Examples of nuisance are "intangible intrusions, such as noise, odor, or light alone."
Wilson v. Interlake Steel Co., 32 Cal. 3d 229, 233, 649 P.2d 922, 924, 185 Cal. Rptr. 280, 282
(1982). However, clear distinctions are not always easily drawn. See Martin v. Reynolds Met-
als Co., 221 Or. 86, 342 P.2d 790 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 918 (1960), which held that
gases and particulates containing fluoride compounds caused a trespass and not a nuisance. In
Borland v. Sanders Lead Co., 369 So. 2d 523 (Ala. 1979), the court allowed an action in
trespass for lead pollution. The Borland court adopted the reasoning in Martin, and distin-
guished trespass from nuisance by the nature of the interest interfered with by the intrusion.
The court held that "[i]f the intrusion interferes with the right to exclusive possession of prop-
erty, the law of trespass applies. If the intrusion is to the interest in use and enjoyment of
property, the law of nuisance applies." Borland, 369 So. 2d at 529. The Borland court noted
that "the remedies of trespass and nuisance are not necessarily mutually exclusive," id., and
construed the Alabama nuisance statute as sufficiently comprehensive to find that "conduct
which rises to the level of trespass to land, generally speaking, would support a nuisance ac-
tion; the converse, however, is not necessarily true." Id. at 529 n.l.
108. Although the nuisance plaintiff may also seek damages, the preferred remedy is injunc-
tion. R. CUNNINGHAM, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 417 (1984).
109. For a definition of private nuisance, see infra text accompanying note 115.
110. R. CUNNINGHAM, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 417 (1984).
111. Id. See infra text accompanying note 116 for a definition of public nuisance.
112. See infra text accompanying notes 118-20.
113. 108 Ariz. 178, 494 P.2d 700 (1972).
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The defendant, Spur, operated a cattle feedlot in an agricultural area
far removed from any significant population. The plaintiff, Webb, a real
estate development company, purchased land near the feedlot and began
development of an extensive retirement community. The development
eventually expanded to within 500 feet of the feedlot. Webb brought an
action to enjoin the operation of the feedlot as a public nuisance alleging
that the flies and odor from the feedlot caused an annoying and un-
healthful condition for the residents of the retirement community.'
14
In its analysis, the court first drew a distinction between private and
public nuisance. Noting the difference to be one of degree, the court de-
scribed private nuisance as "affecting a small number of persons in the
enjoyment of private rights not common to the public.' ' 115 A public nui-
sance, on the other hand, affects a large number of persons in the enjoy-
ment of those rights enjoyed by the community as a whole.' 16 The court
noted that if this had been a private nuisance action, Spur would not be
enjoined because of the slight injury to the individual residents.
1 17
The court held, however, that Spur's operation must be enjoined
because a statute defined a public nuisance that is dangerous to the public
health as "[a]ny condition . . . in populous areas which constitutes a
breeding place for flies." 118 Because public policy dictated that the only
remedy for a public nuisance was an injunction, the court had no discre-
tion not to enjoin Spur's operation.1 19 Because the "flies" and "populous
areas")120 elements required to prove public nuisance were satisfied, and
114. Id. at 179-82, 494 P.2d at 702-05.
115. Id. at 183, 494 P.2d at 705.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 183-84, 494 P.2d at 705-06. The Spur court noted that in an action for private
nuisance, the residents at most would be entitled to damages and not injunctive relief. See also
Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970)
(damages may be the sole remedy in private nuisance case where court balances the relative
hardships of the parties).
118. Spur, 108 Ariz. at 184, 494 P.2d at 706. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-601 (West
1974) provides:
A. The following conditions are specifically declared public nuisances dangerous to
the public health:
1. Any condition or place in populous areas which constitutes a breeding place for
flies, rodents, mosquitoes and other insects which are capable of carrying and trans-
mitting disease-causing organisms to any person or persons.
119. Spur, 108 Ariz. at 184, 494 P.2d at 706. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-601(B)-(C)
provides for the service of cease and desist orders and for hearings to determine whether or not
the challenged practice violates state health laws. Section 36-601(C) deals with the failure of
the person served to comply with the cease and desist order, and provides for "an action in the
superior court of the county in which a violation has occurred, restraining and enjoining the
person from engaging in further acts. The court shall proceed as in other actions for injunc-
tions." Id.
120. Spur, 108 Ariz. at 184, 494 P.2d at 706. The court noted that "before an otherwise
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an injunction was a matter of absolute right when a public nuisance was
found, it was irrelevant that Webb brought the "populous" to the area of
the feedlot.
Although concerned with protecting the public interest, the court
maintained that "courts of equity are concerned with protecting the op-
erator of a lawful, albeit obnoxious, business from the result of a knowing
and willful encroachment by others near his business." '12 If this had been
a private nuisance action brought only by Webb, the "coming to the nui-
sance" doctrine would have barred injunctive relief. 22 On the other
hand, if Spur had located within the forseeable growth pattern of the
city, the feedlot would have had to bear the cost of abating the nuisance
to persons locating nearby.123 Thus, the court articulated a discretionary
right to enjoin a private nuisance which considered the relative fault of
the parties.
The court applied this discretion, not to the issuance of the injunc-
tion, but to determine whether Webb was required to indemnify Spur for
the resulting injury. 124 Noting that Spur was innocent of any wrongdo-
ing, that it was required to close only because of the law's concern for the
public welfare, and that Webb caused the injury by "coming to the nui-
sance," the court ordered Webb to indemnify Spur for any damages
caused by the injunction. 125 The court also considered the windfall to
Webb, who had been able to purchase inexpensive rural property, build a
community and then force an established and otherwise lawful business
to leave.1 26 Hence, the Spur court allowed a defendant in a nuisance
action the discretionary right to seek damages caused by the holder of an
absolute right to enjoin a nuisance.
This absolute right to enjoin Spur's use of its own property is very
similar to Warsaw's absolute right to a prescriptive easement over Chi-
cago Metallic's property in the present case. Each right deprives the
underlying property owner of the right to use its property. The Spur
court's concern for the injury caused by the lawful exercise of this right
lawful (and necessary) business may be declared a public nuisance, there must be a 'populous'
area in which people are injured." Id. (quoting MacDonald v. Perry, 32 Ariz. 39, 49-50, 255
P.2d 494, 497 (1927)).
121. Spur, 108 Ariz. at 184, 494 P.2d at 706.
122. Id. at 185, 494 P.2d at 707. In discussing the "coming to the nuisance" defense in a
nuisance action, the court noted that "courts have held that the residential landowner may not
have relief if he knowingly came into a neighborhood reserved for industrial or agricultural
endeavors and has been damaged thereby." Id. at 184-85, 494 P.2d at 706-07.
123. Id. at 185, 494 P.2d at 707.
124. Id. at 185-86, 494 P.2d at 707-08.
125. Id. at 186, 494 P.2d at 708.
126. Id.
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compelled it to vest the injured party with the discretionary right to dam-
ages for the injury caused by the injunction.1 27 This same concern for
the injury caused by a "lawful taking" should have prompted the War-
saw court to give the underlying property owner the discretionary right
to damages for the injury caused by a court's declaration of a prescriptive
right which results in a windfall for one party.
V. PROPOSED REMEDIES
A. Balancing of the Relative Hardships
A court's approach to resolving encroachment cases is premised on
its discretion to declare an easement in favor of the encroacher. In exer-
cising this discretion, courts have balanced the relative hardships to de-
cide which party has the right to use certain property.1 28 In Warsaw,
there was no such discretion because Warsaw had established all of the
elements necessary for prescriptive title. 129 The court, however, should
retain the discretion to compensate the underlying property owner for its
injury.1 0 The discretionary analysis used in encroachment cases is well
developed in case law and has provided guidance in reaching equitable
results. It seems appropriate, therefore, that a similar discretionary anal-
ysis be applied to determine the propriety of compensation. That is, the
court should balance the relative hardships of the parties to determine
whether compensation should be paid by the acquirer of a prescriptive
right.
First, the court should examine the parties' conduct that leads to the
creation of the prescriptive right to determine relative fault. 13  Because
trespass is an essential element in prescription, 13 2 the court should con-
sider the conduct creating the need to trespass, and not focus on the
wrongfulness of the trespass itself. In Warsaw, the need to trespass was
not innocent but was the result of Warsaw's willful act. 133 Warsaw con-
structed a large building and placed its loading docks on the side of the
building facing Chicago Metallic's property, knowing that this design left
insufficient space for trucks to maneuver without trespassing on Chicago
Metallic's property.'3 1 Warsaw's awareness of this inadequacy is demon-
127. See supra text accompanying note 121.
128. See supra notes 70-93 and accompanying text.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 46-47.
130. See supra notes 107-26 and accompanying text.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 94-97.
132. See supra text accompanying notes 46-47.
133. See supra note 57.
134. Id
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strated by his unsuccessful attempts to acquire an easement during the
original negotiations with the seller and Chicago Metallic.13
Next, a court should consider the extent of the underlying property
owner's injury that is caused by the declaration of a prescriptive right. In
this case, Chicago Metallic is substantially and irreparably injured by
Warsaw's easement.136 Warsaw's easement and Chicago Metallic's ware-
house used the same area of Chicago Metallic's property and were there-
fore mutually exclusive. By granting Warsaw the use of Chicago
Metallic's property to maneuver its trucks, Chicago Metallic is precluded
from using the same property for its own commercial expansion. Fur-
thermore, this restriction on the use of the property substantially de-
creases its commercial value.
Within the context of encroachment, these first two factors-the
willfulness of the encroacher's conduct and the severity of the injury to
the underlying property owner-preclude a balancing of the relative
hardships and therefore preclude the encroacher from acquiring an ease-
ment. With prescriptive easements, however, these same two factors
should compel the court to balance the relative hardships of the parties
and should favor compensating the underlying property owner. If, on
the other hand, these two factors are not present, the court need not
balance the relative hardships to the parties and the acquirer of the pre-
scriptive right need not compensate the underlying property owner.
137
In Warsaw, these first two factors were present and the court, there-
fore, should have balanced the relative hardships of the parties. 138 The
record reveals that if the easement had not been declared, the commer-
cial value of Warsaw's building would have been destroyed.1 39 Because
the existence of the easement is presumed, however, the relevant inquiry
is into the relative hardships of the parties caused by payment or lack of
payment of compensation. If compensation is not ordered, Warsaw re-
ceives a windfall-the right to use Chicago Metallic's property at no cost
to himself and the right to exclude Chicago Metallic from the use of that
same property.140 Chicago Metallic, on the other hand, is injured at least
135. See supra note 10.
136. See supra text accompanying notes 98-99.
137. Where the easement and the use by the underlying property owner are not mutually
exclusive, the injury is less severe. For example, if Chicago Metallic also used the area in
question to maneuver its vehicles, and neither Warsaw's nor Chicago Metallic's use was af-
fected by the easement, the argument for compensation would lose much of its strength.
138. See supra text accompanying notes 100-02.
139. Warsaw v. Chicago Metallic Ceilings, Inc., 35 Cal. 3d 564, 569, 676 P.2d 584, 586, 199
Cal. Rptr. 773, 775 (1984).
140. This windfall, or unjust enrichment, was also considered by the Spur court. See supra
text accompanying note 126.
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to the extent of Warsaw's gain-it is deprived of the use of its property
without adequate compensation. If compensation is ordered, Warsaw
would not be injured. He is merely required to pay for the property right
he has acquired. While Chicago Metallic may view the loss of its prop-
erty right as irreparable harm, it will receive the fair market value of the
property right it has lost. Regardless of the decision as to compensation,
Warsaw would not suffer any injury. In contrast, the hardship to Chi-
cago Metallic would be great if there is no compensation. This hardship
could be substantially reduced, however, by requiring Warsaw to com-
pensate Chicago Metallic for its loss.
The foregoing analysis does not always require that one who ac-
quires a prescriptive right over the land of another compensate the un-
derlying property owner. It does require, however, a case by case
analysis of the relative hardships to the parties. Such analysis would
have avoided the manifestly unjust result in Warsaw.
B. Legislative Action
It is arguable whether the legislature will act in this area given the
unique facts of this case. It is unlikely that they would be repeated: A
"willful trespasser" who created his need to trespass; an "innocent de-
fendant" who, as a neighborly accommodation or through negligence,
failed to prevent the trespass; and an easement that caused great hard-
ship. Viewed from this perspective, it seems unlikely that this case will
attract legislative attention.
On the other hand, the Warsaw decision conclusively foreclosed ap-
plying equitable principles to any case involving prescription or adverse
possession. 14 1 The court of appeal opinion stressed the flexible and ex-
panding nature of equitable relief, equity's ability to fashion decrees
which will do justice to all parties and equity's ability to meet the needs
of a rapidly changing society.42 The court of appeal applied these princi-
ples to the specific facts before it and fashioned a remedy. 143 By revers-
ing the court of appeal, the supreme court forecloses equitable
consideration in cases involving a party seeking compensation for an in-
jury caused by creation of prescriptive title. This withdrawal, coupled
with the manifestly unjust result in Warsaw, should compel the legisla-
ture to respond.
The relevant statute for prescriptive easements is California Civil
141. Warsaw, 35 Cal. 3d at 574-75, 676 P.2d at 589-90, 199 Cal. Rptr. 778-79.
142. Warsaw v. Chicago Metallic Ceilings, Inc., 139 Cal. App. 3d 260, 270, 188 Cal. Rptr.
563, 569 (1983), vacated, 35 Cal. 3d 564, 676 P.2d 584, 199 Cal. Rptr. 773 (1984).
143. Id.
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Code section 1007." This section describes the title acquired by pre-
scription and it was relied on by the supreme court in Warsaw."a Specif-
ically, the court relied on the language, "title by prescription which is
sufficient against all," to remove the issue of compensation from equita-
ble consideration.146 To allow courts to consider equitable relief, the fol-
lowing amendment is proposed:
Upon the acquisition of prescriptive title, the court shall bal-
ance the relative hardships of the parties and, when the court
concludes that the interests of justice so require, it shall order
the payment of reasonable compensation to the party dispos-
sessed, or make any other equitable order necessary to do jus-
tice to all of the parties before the court.
The effect of this amendment would be to subject prescriptive title to
equitable considerations. "Interests of justice" is sufficiently broad to al-
low consideration of a wide range of inequitable results. "Compensa-
tion" is specified as one form of relief but is not made a limitation by
including the phrase "any other equitable order necessary to do justice."
Specific determinations of when relief is necessary and what form the
relief should take are left to the discretion of the court and the well-
developed principles of equity jurisprudence.
VI. CONCLUSION
The law concerning acquisition of property rights by prescription
and adverse possession evolved in an agrarian society. Justice Grodin's
concurring opinion in Warsaw noted the inability to justify the law of
prescription in our modem society. 147 "[H]ow, in today's urban society,
litigation is reduced or the peace is preserved by allowing persons situ-
ated as are these plaintiffs to acquire rights in what is concededly the
land of another without a cent of payment is beyond my comprehen-
sion. '  Legislative action may, or may not, be forthcoming. Until such
time as the legislature chooses to act, however, courts must exercise their
equitable power to avoid the manifestly unjust result reached in Warsaw.
Darryl S. Cordle
144. See supra note 21 for text of pertinent part of CAL. CIV. CODE § 1007.
145. Warsaw, 35 Cal. 3d at 574-75, 676 P.2d at 589-90, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 778-79.
146. Id.
147. Warsaw v. Chicago Metallic Ceilings, Inc., 35 Cal. 3d 564, 576, 676 P.2d at 584, 591,
199 Cal. Rptr. 773, 780 (1980) (Grodin, J., concurring).
148. Id.
